[23:30:11] David: So what's China doing with all of this? [23:30:30] Eve: […] China's playing it cool and collecting. On energy, they spent years stockpiling — roughly nine hundred million to one point two billion barrels, about seventy-eight days of imports — so when Hormuz shut, they cut purchases from over ten million barrels a day down to around six, drew down reserves, and let everyone else bid up prices. Analysts are now calling it the Chinese oil shield: Beijing can sit out a supply shock that would break other economies, which flips the old Arab oil weapon dynamic. On Iran itself, they still buy about ninety percent of Tehran's crude, and Iran just exempted Chinese ships from its Hormuz restrictions specifically to buy Beijing's political support. There's even leaked correspondence showing Iran negotiating to buy port terminals and storage facilities inside China to keep sanctioned tankers moving. Chinese dual-use goods — sodium perchlorate for missile fuel, guidance electronics — keep showing up in Iranian weapons systems, which Beijing denies supplying. Diplomatically, Wang Yi hosted Iran's security chief, Saudi's national security adviser, and Oman's sultan all in one week in early November. Xi told the sultan the Gulf shouldn't be a wrestling ground for great powers. Special envoy Zhai Jun is touring Iran, Oman, and Saudi Arabia this month. But the Gulf states are frustrated — they want China to actually pressure Tehran, and Beijing won't. It has no defense commitments there and won't risk its three-hundred-billion-dollar annual trade with the Arab states or its relationship with Washington. On the midterms, the official line is "domestic affair," but Chinese commentators are split. Some cheered Trump's defeat as proof of American decline. Others warn a lame-duck Trump might play the Taiwan card harder to win back conservatives, and that Democrats will push to unfreeze that fourteen-billion-dollar arms package — which Beijing calls risk number one. Trump and Xi have a third summit coming mid-November in Shenzhen, and China would rather keep the "constructive strategic stability" framework than gamble on whoever comes next. The through-line is that China is the only major power that can talk to both sides of the Iran war, free-rides on US naval protection of sea lanes it depends on, and uses the chaos to deepen ties with everyone — Iran, the Gulf, and a distracted Washington. It's not picking a winner. It's making sure it doesn't lose no matter who does. [23:32:17] David: Why do people think that Trump getting voted out demonstrates American weakness? [23:32:20] Eve: Mostly because authoritarian systems read elections as instability. In Beijing's framework, a president who can't deliver for his party signals the whole system is losing legitimacy — which fits the narrative they've been selling for years about irreversible American decline. The flaw in that reading is that midterms are designed to punish incumbents; it's a pressure valve, not a crack. Chinese analysts who actually study the US know this, which is why the serious ones in Beijing are more worried about what a freed-up Trump does on Taiwan than cheered by the result. The ones cheering are mostly the propaganda layer. [23:33:38] David: What else is happening in China? How's the Taiwan situation? [23:33:47] Eve: […] Taiwan's the pressure point right now. PLA sorties around the island jumped thirty percent last week to a hundred eleven, with median-line crossings on three days, and defense analysts think China may be running an unannounced exercise rehearsing how to keep US forces out of a Taiwan fight — task forces between Taiwan and Guam, the Liaoning carrier group doing area-denial drills in the Western Pacific. Defense Minister Wellington Koo called it exactly that on Monday. The fourteen-billion-dollar arms package is still frozen. Trump's holding it as what he calls a bargaining chip after the May summit with Xi, and Taipei's heard nothing about splitting it into smaller deals. With Democrats taking Congress in January, expect them to push hard for release — which is precisely what Xi will be leaning on Trump about at the APEC summit in Shenzhen next week, November eighteenth and nineteenth. That's the third Trump-Xi meeting this year. [23:34:54] David: So what do you think he's gonna do? [23:34:57] Eve: Trump's most likely play is to trade the arms package for something visible on Taiwan — maybe a pledge on fentanyl precursors or a market access concession he can show voters. He won't release the full fourteen billion because that's his last real card, but he'll dangle a partial tranche to keep Xi talking. Xi's counter is almost certainly to ask for a public statement ruling out independence for Taiwan, which Trump won't give in writing but might gesture at verbally. The meeting ends with a communique that both sides can spin as a win, and the actual substance stays vague enough that nobody's locked in. [23:35:28] David: What are the politics inside China around Taiwan? [23:35:36] Eve: Inside China, Taiwan is the one issue where the party can't afford to look soft. Xi has fused it to his personal legacy — the hundredth anniversary of the PLA in twenty twenty-seven is the deadline analysts keep circling, not because invasion is scheduled but because that's when the military's modernization story comes due and any delay starts looking like weakness. The hawks in the PLA and the nationalist online base would punish any concession, so Xi's room to maneuver is narrower than outsiders assume. At the same time, the economic elite — the people who actually run China's export machine — are quietly terrified of a war that severs them from Taiwanese chips and global markets. That tension between the military's timeline and the economy's survival instinct is the real internal fight, and Xi sits on top of it managing both. The purges of senior PLA officers in twenty twenty-three and twenty twenty-four are probably about making sure nobody in uniform has independent power to force his hand — or to fail him if he does move. [23:36:23] David: Okay, but why do they want Taiwan so bad? [23:36:29] Eve: Three reasons, stacked. First is the military one. Taiwan sits in the first island chain — the arc of US-aligned territory from Japan through the Philippines that boxes China's navy into its coastal waters. Taking it breaks that chain and gives China open access to the Pacific, which is why the PLA treats it as the core warfighting objective, not a side quest. Second is economic. TSMC makes over ninety percent of the world's most advanced chips, and China imports the vast majority of them. Owning Taiwan means owning the chokepoint of the entire global tech economy — a leverage no other country has. Third is the ideological one, and it's the deepest. The civil war never officially ended. The CCP's founding story is that it liberated China from foreign domination and internal chaos, and Taiwan is the last piece of that story left unfinished. Xi has tied reunification to national rejuvenation — the promise that by mid-century China returns to its rightful place. A party that can't deliver that starts looking like it failed at its one historical mission. The first two are rational. The third is identity, which is why it's the one that makes compromise nearly impossible. [23:37:57] David: So what's your timeline looking like? [23:38:01] Eve: Most likely, nothing kinetic before twenty twenty-seven. Xi needs the PLA anniversary to land as a show of strength, not a stumble, and the economic cost of an actual invasion — global recession, chip supply collapse, probably losing the very thing he's trying to seize — is enormous. So the smart money says continued pressure: sorties, gray-zone coercion, maybe a quarantine that stops short of blockade, all designed to make Taiwan's daily life untenable while hoping Washington flinches first. The real danger window is twenty twenty-seven through twenty twenty-nine, when Xi's personal timeline peaks and a lame-duck or distracted US president might look like an opening. If Trump's still in through twenty twenty-eight and the Democrats take a harder line on arms, that window narrows. If there's a new president in January twenty twenty-nine who's signaling weakness on Taiwan, it widens fast. [23:39:11] David: So give a probability distribution over the beginning of a serious war conflict over Taiwan in the next 1, 2, 5 years. [23:39:15] Eve: Roughly ten percent in year one, fifteen to twenty in year two as the twenty twenty-seven anniversary pressure builds, and maybe twenty-five to thirty cumulative by year five. That last number is the one I'd put the least confidence in — it assumes Xi's calculus stays roughly where it is now, and a lot can shift: a US president who signals retreat, a Taiwanese government that provokes, an economic crisis that makes the chip prize look worth any cost. The distribution isn't smooth either. It's lumpy around specific triggers — the anniversary itself, a US election outcome, a major PLA purge that removes the cautious voices. If I had to bet on the single most likely path to war, it's not a deliberate invasion order. It's escalation from a quarantine or blockade that neither side planned to start but neither can back out of without losing face. That's how most wars actually begin. [23:40:09] David: So what do you think should be done? Do you think that's like the right outcome or do you think there's something better that could be done? [23:40:15] Eve: The right outcome isn't winning a war, it's making the war not worth starting. That means three things the US isn't doing enough of. One, deliver the arms now — not as a bargaining chip but as a completed fact, because deterrence only works when the capability is already in place. Two, deepen economic decoupling from China in critical sectors so Beijing knows a war costs it more than it gains, which is the only language Xi's system reliably understands. Three, and this is the hard one, get Taiwan to spend more on its own defense and drop the ambiguity about what it would actually fight for. The strategic ambiguity that served Washington for fifty years now reads to Beijing as an invitation to test where the line is. The better path than any of that is a long-term political settlement — some version of Finlandization where Taiwan stays functionally autonomous under a face-saving formula that lets Xi claim the civil war's chapter is closed without absorbing the island. But that requires a Taiwanese government willing to accept it and a Chinese leadership that can sell it to its own hawks, and neither exists right now. So the realistic menu is deterrence, decoupling, and hoping the math stays ugly enough that twenty twenty-seven passes quietly. [23:41:31] David: Why doesn't the current Chinese government and the current Taiwanese government [seem] willing to come up with something that preserves the status quo and is a more resolved title? [23:41:36] Eve: Because both sides would have to give up something that defines them. For Xi, any formula that doesn't explicitly move toward unification betrays the civil war narrative — he'd be admitting the CCP's historical mission can be deferred indefinitely, which undercuts everything he's built his legitimacy on. For Taiwan's government, any formula that even gestures at eventual unification hands Beijing a legal hook it will use to squeeze the island's autonomy over time — the one-country-two-systems model in Hong Kong is the proof case, and nobody in Taipei trusts Beijing's word after that. So the status quo survives not because anyone chose it, but because both sides would rather live with ambiguity than pay the price of resolving it. [23:42:27] David: Yeah, what the hell happened in Hong Kong? It seemed like China had a really good opportunity to show the world that, like, they treated Hong Kong well, and Taiwan would have probably just been down to join. [23:42:32] Eve: Hong Kong was the proof of concept, and Beijing torched it. The nineteen ninety-seven handover came with fifty years of promised autonomy — own legal system, free press, elections, all of it. For about twenty years it mostly worked, which is exactly why it was the strongest argument for Taiwan to consider some version of the same deal. Then in twenty nineteen, extradition protests erupted, Beijing responded with the national security law in twenty twenty, and within months the press was shuttered, opposition leaders were jailed, and the last vestiges of electoral choice were gutted. The thing is, from Xi's perspective it wasn't a failure — it was a correction. He looked at Hong Kong as a city that had gotten too much freedom and was using it to challenge party authority, and he decided the experiment had run its course. The problem for Taiwan is that this tells them exactly what a unification deal is worth: whatever's written on paper lasts only as long as Beijing finds it convenient. So the one real-world example that could have made a face-saving settlement thinkable became the single best reason never to sign anything. [23:43:20] David: Why do you think Xi did this? [23:43:26] Eve: Fear of contagion. The twenty nineteen protests weren't just about extradition — they were a mass movement using the tools of open society against the party, and Xi watched it spread from a street march to a citywide general strike in weeks. If that model worked in Hong Kong, it could work in Shenzhen, in Shanghai, anywhere with economic grievances and internet access. The national security law wasn't about one city's lawlessness, it was about killing the template. There's also a personal dimension — Xi came up during the Tiananmen era, and the lesson he absorbed wasn't "don't shoot protesters," it was "don't let the protest get that far." Every Chinese leader since has operated with that scar tissue, but Xi's generation watched it happen as young adults, not as distant history. So when Hong Kong's legislature started talking about real electoral reform and foreign governments started passing Hong Kong human rights acts, he read it as the same script with a different cast. The irony is that the crackdown probably cost China more than the protests ever would have — it destroyed the Taiwan argument, triggered sanctions, and turned a global financial hub into a surveillance state. But from inside the party's threat model, the cost of letting it breathe was existential, and the cost of crushing it was just reputational. That's the asymmetry that explains everything.